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Abstract
Quantum mechanics describes certain systems as being in superpo-
sitions of their properties, yet every measurement on every system that
we are able to perform yields a determinate result. The “orthodox”
formulation of the theory builds this in by including a postulate that
such superpositions “collapse” at the time of measurement. This strat-
egy fails to really explain why such measurements are determinate, is
unacceptably imprecise, and makes observation basic in fundamental
physical theory, which looks like the wrong sort of process for the job.
The problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is the prob-
lem of finding a more satisfactory understanding of the formalism in
∗This project began in an independent study with Craig Callender, who provided much
help in terms of direction, discussion, comments, and continuing support. Thanks also to
Jeffrey Barrett for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper, including
helping me find some clearer and more economical way of putting some crucial points.
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the face of these problems. Carlo Rovelli’s relational interpretation of
quantum mechanics holds that a system’s states or the values of its
physical quantites as normally conceived only exist relative to a cut
between a system and an observer or measuring instrument. Further-
more, on Rovelli’s account, the appearance of determinate observa-
tions from pure quantum superpositions happens only relative to the
interaction of the system and observer. Jeffrey Barrett has pointed out
that certain relational interpretations suffer from what we might call
the “determinacy problem,” but the interpretations that Barrett con-
siders make facts relative to branches of the universal wave function
rather than to system/observer cuts. Thus, Barrett misclassifies Rov-
elli’s interpretation, which differs from the interpretations that Barrett
explicitly worries about and has the resources to escape his particular
criticisms. Rovelli’s interpretation still leaves us with a paradox hav-
ing to do with the determinacy of measurement outcomes, which can
be accepted only if we are willing to give up on certain elements of
the “absolute” view of the world.
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics describes certain systems as being in superpositions of
their properties, yet every measurement on every system that we are able
to perform yields a determinate result. The “orthodox” formulation of the
theory builds this in by including a postulate that such superpositions “col-
lapse” at the time of measurement. This strategy fails to really explain why
such measurements are determinate, is unacceptably imprecise, and makes
observation basic in fundamental physical theory, which looks like the wrong
sort of process for the job. The problem of the interpretation of quantum
mechanics is the problem of finding a more satisfactory understanding of the
formalism in the face of these problems.
Carlo Rovelli’s [Rov96, Laud05] relational interpretation of quantum me-
chanics holds that a system’s states1 or the values of its physical quantites as
1I speak of the “state” of the system throughout the paper, though, in the considered
view of both the supporters of the relational interpretation [Laud05] and myself, it is
infelicitous to call the wavefunction / Hilbert-space vector of the system “the state” or
to treat it as what corresponds to the classical state. Better to speak of the quantities of
physical variables or operators like “position” and “momentum” as those things that have
reality (relatively speaking). Nevertheless, as nothing crucial is lost in the translation for
2
normally conceived only exist relative to a cut between system and observer
(alternatively: measurement system, exosystem, metasystem, measurement
frame). Furthermore, on Rovelli’s account, the appearance of (absolutely)
determinate observations from pure (superposed) quantum states happens
only relative to the interaction of the system with the exosystem. Jeffrey
Barrett [Bar99] has pointed out that certain relational interpretations like
Rovelli’s suffer from what we might call the “determinacy problem,” but the
interpretations that Barrett considers make facts relative to branches of the
universal wave function rather than to cuts. While Rovelli’s interpretation
differs from the sorts of interpretations the Barrett explicitly worries about
and has the resources to escape his particular criticisms, the relational inter-
pretation still results in a paradox. The problem manifests itself for Rovelli’s
interpretation not as a problem of determinate experience, as Barrett worries
about, and it doesn’t arise for the same reason it arises in interpretations of
Everett or on Mermin’s interpretation, but it instead manifests as our inabil-
ity to give any absolute or gods-eye-view descriptions of events.
First, I will give a brief description of the view, following Rovelli’s pre-
sentation. Next, I will discuss Barrett’s criticisms of David Mermin’s inter-
pretation, and then contrast Rovelli’s interpretation with Mermin’s in a way
that draws out further features of Rovelli’s interpretation as well as showing
how it escapes Barrett’s criticisms. In the next section, I discuss a further
puzzle for Rovelli’s interpretation, and I finish by considering two strategies
for dissolving the puzzle that the relationalist can employ (the second better
than the first).
2 Relational Quantum Mechanics
Rovelli [Rov96] takes his cues on the interpretation of quantum mechanics
from Einstein,2 particularly Einstein’s landmark 1905 paper on special rel-
ativity. Einstein accomplishes two things in his paper on special relativity
that inspire Rovelli. First, Einstein provides an interpretation of an already
existing formalism (the Lorentz transformations), answering the charges that
the formalism is unreasonable or inconsistent by criticizing an implicit as-
the purposes of this paper, I speak of states in order to stick closer to Rovelli’s original
presentation [Rov96] and achieve maximal familiarity.
2He is not the first to have done so. Both Heisenberg and Bohr saw themselves as
making moves analogous to Einstein’s relativity. See also [Fink96, Fink04].
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sumption (absolute simultaneity) that is “inappropriate to describe reality
when velocities are high”[Rov96, p. 2]. Second, Einstein does not merely
tack an interpretation on to the formalism, but he attempts to understand
or in some sense derive the formalism on the basis of some simple physical
principles (ones that may seem contradictory given the inappropriate as-
sumptions: in the case of special relativity, “equivalence of inertial observers
and universality of the speed of light”[Rov96, p. 2]).
Rovelli is interested in following Einstein’s strategy in both respects when
giving his interpretation of quantum mechanics. His program would start
with some simple physical assertions, showing that they entail a rejection of
some inappropriate assumption(s), and then derive the formalism of quan-
tum theory from them. He admits that this project is not yet completely
successful, and so splits the discussion into two parts: a motivation of some
basic ideas about quantum mechanics from a discussion of the “third person
problem,” the conjunction of which lead us to the discovery of the inappropri-
ate assumptions that form our uneasy attitude towards quantum mechanics,
and an attempt to reconstruct the formalism (somewhat informally) from a
small number of postulates suggested by the first discussion, dealing with the
information systems have about each other.3 I will focus on the first part of
Rovelli’s discussion.
Rovelli draws his main conclusions from a discussion of the “third man
problem,” which we can see as follows:4 Suppose observer (or measuring
apparatus) O is measuring a property of system S (e.g., a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus measuring the x-spin of an electron, with possible values of spin-
up and spin-down). We’ll represent the two eigenstates of that property as
|↑〉S and |↓〉S. If S is in the arbitrary state |ψ〉S = α |↑〉S + β |↓〉S, when O
measures the electron’s x-spin, he will find the value ‘up’ (with probability
|α2|) or ‘down’ (with probability |β2|). Now, suppose that O measures S and
in fact finds it to be up. We usually represent this with the following state
transition:
3So Rovelli’s project is incomplete in three ways: the principles fail to be motivated in-
dependently of the formalism, the postulates do not fall directly out of the first discussion,
and the derivation lacks some rigor, especially with the ad hoc introduction of the principle
that allows for superpositions. Despite Rovelli’s failure to meet his own desiderata, his
view does address familiar problems in an interestingly new way, and may have merits on
its own that forgive this incompleteness.
4This is just the Wigner’s friend case, without any reference to human agents or con-
sciousness. S is the system, O is the friend, and P is Wigner.
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t1 → t2
α |↑〉S + β |↓〉S → |↑〉S (1)
Here we have what is referred to in orthodox expositions of quantum theory
as the “collapse of the state / wavefunction” (von Neumann’s Process I ).
Now consider observer P who treats both the observer and system from
our previous discussion as the quantum mechanical system S + O. P treats
both the state of the system S as well as the measuring device of O, which has
the eigenstates |ready〉O, |up〉O, and |down〉O corresponding to its readout of
‘ready’, ‘up’, and ‘down’. If P has not performed a measurement at t2, and
instead only knows that there is an interaction, then just given the linearity
of quantum mechanics, the state transition according to P (|ψ〉SO) will be:
t1 → t2
|ready〉O(α |↑〉S + β |↓〉S) → α|up〉O |↑〉S + β|down〉O |↓〉S (2)
This process, unlike (1), proceeds entirely according to the linear dynamics
(von Neumann’s Process II ).
From this discussion, Rovelli derives the following principle (what he calls
the “main observation”):
R1 “In quantum mechanics different observers may give different accounts
of the same sequence of events.” [Rov96, p. 4]5
The sequence of events from t1 to t2 are described quite differently from the
perspective of O and P . Particularly, O reports an event at t2 where there
is a measurement of a determinate property, while P reports an interaction
between two quantum systems without any determinacy in the property of
either subsystem (O or S).
Rovelli takes this principle and then analyzes various interpretations of
quantum mechanics as attempts to weasel out of R1, that is, as attempts to
say that (1) and (2) can’t both be true. Collapse theories say that (1) but
5As pointed out to me in comments on an earlier draft of this paper, this principle
bears some resemblance to Bohr’s principle of complementarity, which should be carefully
distinguished from the “orthodox” interpretation.
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not (2) is true, because interaction with the macroscopic measuring device
(or something) causes the collapse of S’s state. Versions of Everett’s theory
say that (2) but not (1) is true, because wavefunctions never collapse. If the
formalism really implies (1) and (2), all such theories constitute a denial
of the validity of the quantum formalism in some circumstances. Other
interpretations, according to Rovelli, deny the basic formalism in some other
way. These discussions are a little more complex, and their details need not
concern is here. The discussion of collapse and Everettian theories will serve
to see the general point.
Rovelli counters with a quite strong realism about the ordinary formula-
tion of quantum theory, described by the following principle (with he calls
“Hypothesis 2” or “Completeness”):
R2 “Quantum mechanics provides a complete and self-consistent scheme of
description of the physical world, appropriate to our present level of
experimental observations.” [Rov96, p. 7]
Where quantum mechanics, for Rovelli, is just the formalism as it is normally
used in basic applications.6 The conjunction of R1 and R2, understood in
conjunction with the rest of the discussion, leads us to the following conclu-
sion:
Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of
physical systems relative to other systems, and this is a complete
description of the world. [Rov96, p. 7]
This is sensible enough; after all, it would seem that the only way for different
observers to give different but correct accounts would be to make the truth
of accounts relative to different observers. So, we must include information
about the system/metasystem cut when we specifies states, observables, and
quantities. That is, we must introduce a new indexical into the formalism:
6It is crucial to note the significance of the formalism as it is normally used. In par-
ticular, you will not see ordinary physics textbooks discussing the wave function of the
Entire Universe, nor will such a wave function play a role in any familiar application of
the formalism. It is an entity that is quite familiar to philosophers of physics, but one
that Rovelli would see as entirely outside the normal usage. The formalism as normally
used relies on a system/observer split, where only the system (in some sense) is described
in the formalism. As we will see later on, this understanding of quantum mechanics is
crucial to understanding Rovelli’s position.
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we speak of |ψ〉S/O and |ψ〉SO/P , not |ψ〉S and |ψ〉SO simpliciter. At t2 in the
example above, we consider the following state ascriptions:
|ψ〉S/O = |↑〉S
|ψ〉SO/P = α|up〉O |↑〉S + β|down〉O |↓〉S
From this conclusion it quickly follows that “the notion of observer-independent
description of the world” is inappropriate. Giving up this notion (like giving
up the notion of absolute simultaneity in the case of special relativity) is
supposed to put our worries about quantum mechanics at ease.
3 Barrett on Relational Interpretations
Rather than discussing Rovelli’s view explicitly, Jeffrey Barrett [Bar99] as-
similates Rovelli’s interpretation to David Mermin’s view, which he discusses
in detail. According to Barrett, Mermin tries to “understand quantum me-
chanics in terms of statistical correlations without there being any determi-
nate correlata that the statistical correlations characterize”[Bar99, p. 217].
Expanding further, he says that on Mermin’s view,
physics, properly understood, is about correlations and only cor-
relations. It is not about correlations between determinate phys-
ical records nor is it about correlations between any other deter-
minate physical properties. Rather, physics is about correlations
without correlata. According to Mermin, ‘Correlations have phys-
ical realty; that which they correlate does not’7 [Bar99, p. 217].
To put it another way, just as we normally index quantum states to times,
views like Mermin’s introduce an additional index into the variables of the
theory that refers to the branch of the wave function relative to which the
variable has a certain value. In the cases above, O would say that S is spin-
up relative to S being |↑〉S, and S would be |↑〉S relative to O observing it
to be so, while O measures S as spin-down relative to S being |↓〉S, and S
is |↓〉S relative to O observing it to be so. All that we can say “absolutely”
is that S and O are correlated in a certain way; any further statements are
relative to choice of a certain branch.
7Barrett quotes [Mer97, p. 2]
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Barrett makes three major arguments against Mermin’s account [Bar99,
pp. 218-9]: (i) relations are necessarily relations between determinate relata,
that is, a relations-without-relata view is (either metaphysically or analyti-
cally) incoherent; (ii) on Mermin’s interpretation, there are no determinate
physical records, and thus there are no determinate mental records (if mental
states supervene on physical states in the ordinary way), and thus there are
no determinate experiences, and thus the theory makes no determinate em-
pirical predictions; (iii) Mermin’s version of the theory does not even predict
the right correlations since it does not tell us how to update the quantum
state after a measurement. These criticisms are quite damning, if accurate.
It is not my purpose to say whether Barrett gives a fair account of Mermin’s
view, nor to give responses on behalf of Mermin. Instead, I will examine how
Rovelli’s account differs from the Mermin’s view (as presented by Barrett),
and ask whether Barrett’s criticisms apply to Rovelli’s account as well.
It turns out that there are a number of differences between Rovelli’s view
and the view that Barrett attacks. The most important thing to notice
is that Rovelli indexes facts not to branches, but to a certain cut. Rov-
elli’s account admits a distinction between types of relations: on the one
hand, there are system-system relations, and, on the other, there are system-
observer relations. System-system relations are interactions among elements
of the system that can become entangled quantum-mechanical correlations.
System-observer relations are interactions between the system and observer
such that a property of the system becomes actualized for the observer.
While there is always in principle an observer who can treat any system-
observer relation as a system-system relation (e.g., moving from O to P ),
that new observer will have different information about the system than the
first, including different information about the determinacy of properties of
the system. To make it sound less epistemic, the new observer will define
a different cut between system and observer, and so the states, properties,
etc., will, in general, be different.
From this, we can see that Rovelli would say something different about
determinacy and relata/correlata. Insofar as we are looking for absolutely
determinate relata, then Rovelli would agree that there are no such things.
Rovelli’s relations do hold between relata (different physical systems), and
those relata can be determinate relative to system-observer relations. Deter-
minacy is not entirely absent; it is just relativized to certain observer-system
cuts. Furthermore, by performing the proper measurements (that is, by inter-
acting with the system in the right ways), the observer can find determinate
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answers to any well-formed question (that is, the observer can render any
particular property of the system determinate). What is more, different ob-
servers can get together and compare notes about their determinate results
and they will find that they agree (though more on this later).
We can understand the peculiar relativity of determinacy better by asking
why the unitary dynamics fails to apply in the system-observer interactions.
This happens because of the incompleteness of O’s description of the inter-
action. As Rovelli puts it:
From the point of view of [P ], the measurement is therefore a
fully unitary evolution, which is determined by the interaction
Hamiltonian between O and S. An interaction is a measurement
that brings the states to a correlated configuration. On the other
hand, O gives a dynamical desciption of S alone. Therefore he
can only use the S Hamiltonian. Since between times t1 and t2 the
evolution of S is affected by its interaction with O, the description
of the unitary evolution of S give by O breaks down. The unitary
evolution does not break down for mysterious physical quantum
jumps, due to unknown effects, but simply because O is not giving
a full dynamical description of the interaction. O cannot have a
full description of the interaction of S with himself (O) because
his information is correlation, and there is no meaning in being
correlated with oneself. [Rov97, p. 205]
We can make a useful analogy to thermodynamics. So long as I am dealing
with a closed system, the second law of thermodynamics applies. Once I
open the system up to an influx of energy from outside, the second law
breaks down, but that is only because I am not giving a full description of
the interaction. I can bring the energy source into my description of the
system, and it “becomes” a closed system again, to which the second law
applies perfectly well. Just as the order in an open system can increase, even
though a closed-system description would not allow this, a non-dynamical
description on a quantum system (i.e., one in which a measurement, and
thus an intervention, has been made) can lead to a determinate result, even
though a dynamical description (i.e., one that includes both system and
measuring device) would not describe a determinate result.8
8This analogy is not completely felicitous, because one can justly call the closed system
in thermodynamics the complete description, and treat the effects in the open-system
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We can now provide answers to Barrett on Rovelli’s behalf. First, counter
to (i), it is not the case that relations necessarily depend on determinate re-
lata. Models of relations with relata of a nondeterminate nature date back at
least to Plato’s Theaetetus, if not further.9 Similarly, it seems that if we look
at the perfect symmetry in defining volumes by integrating over points, or
defining points as by series of smaller and smaller volumes, or the symmetry
between defining graph-structures by listing their edges or their vertices, and
other such symmetries10, it appears that there is no more problem giving
primary reality to relations and abstracting relata from them, than there
is giving primary reality to relata and showing how relations supervene on
them. Or consider the following possibility: we have discovered that things
can be broken down into molecules, molecules into atoms, atoms into sub-
atomic particles, those particles into more fundamental particles. One might
suppose it likely that this process of discovering smaller-and-smaller con-
stituents will bottom out somewhere (and some believe that we have already
arrived at this level, even if we haven’t discovered all its members). But it is
also imaginable that we find sub-quark particles, and sub-sub-quark particles,
and. . . so on and so on with no end.11 It would certainly be a strange world,
but nothing seems obviously incoherent or inconceivable about it. In such
a case, we would have compounds without (non-compound) constituents, a
special case of relations without relata.12 Whether such theories have their
difficulties, it is not the case that they can be dismissed summarily, without
looking to the specifics of the view.
Whether relations-without-relata views hold up is itself probably beside
the point for Rovelli, because, counter to (ii), determinate physical records
do exist (relative to a cut), as do determinate experiences. Attempting to
understand whether this determinacy is enough will occupy the remainder
of this essay, as it still may have a sort of determinacy problem. But one
should note that this view is crucially different from Mermin’s view, because
description as merely artifacts of an incomplete description. This option is not available
in the quantum case, which will be described below.
9Plato describes the Protagorean/Heraclitean theory of perception as being one built
on relations between nondeterminate relata (so-called “pure flux”).
10Perhaps including the symmetry between Humeanism (See David Lewis) and Causal
Structuralism (See [Haw01]).
11This is just Paul Churchland’s “onion-world” from [Chu85].
12That is, relations without non-relational relata. But it seems obvious that no rela-
tionalist could insist that there were no relata, just that there are no relata that aren’t
themselves relational.
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relations are not the only thing that has physical reality. In addition to
relations, there are interventions that produce determinate physical records.
Now, these records are themselves relational in the sense that their deter-
minacy is relative to a cut, but this relationality is different than Mermin’s
correlations (as seen above), and the description that focuses on the correla-
tions (i.e., the one that treats the elements in question under the dynamics)
is no more fundamental than the other (and in fact, a description that was
entirely at the level of the dynamics would never get any information about
determinate properties).
Counter to (iii), Rovelli (unlike Mermin) can tell each observer how to
update his states after a measurement: just as the standard formalism tells
us to. It is important here to qualify the point made earlier: Rovelli, per-
haps incautiously, says that O does not give “a full dynamical description
of the interaction” of O with S. One could read this with emphasis on the
description not being full. This leads to the question: how could an incom-
plete description solve the problem of metaphysical determinacy. So it would
seem that Rovelli didn’t have a good answer to (ii) after all. Furthermore,
one would also be lead to ask: why would anyone ever be justified in us-
ing an incomplete description if one knows (or knows that there could be) a
more complete description?13 I suggest that if this move is going to do what
Rovelli thinks it does, we must instead read the point at issue with emphasis
on the description not being fully dynamical. Here, we have two different
types of description:14 partially dynamical description plus non-dynamical
intervention versus fully dynamical description. We haven’t got a distinction
between more and less complete descriptions of the same thing, because,
first, the two descriptions are different, relying on different information, but
neither is more complete than the other, second, O can gather more infor-
mation than P at certain points in the process (like the determinate state
of S at t2), and, third, because they aren’t descriptions of the same thing in
the sense of the same state, since states are individuated relative to cuts, not
independent of them (though, of course, it is the same system). The state of
S relative to S/O is not identical to the state of S relative to SO/P .
13Thanks to Jeff Barrett and Craig Callender for pointing out the problems with this
reading.
14Even this is not quite right. The first point is not even a description, exactly, because
quantum mechanics cannot describe what will happen in an intervention, only that there
is some probability of certain things happening.
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4 A Puzzle About Relative States
We can recapture a similar worry about relational quantum mechanics by
comparing what happens at t2 for O to what happens at the time of P ’s
measurement, t3. As noted by von Neumann [vNe32], no matter where one
places a cut, the probabilities will always agree, so, prior to the actual mea-
surements, O and P will agree on the probabilities of finding states associated
with the electron’s being spin-up. According to the Malus-Born law, at t2,
there is a probability of |α2| that O will find S to be x-spin-up and a prob-
ability of |β2| that O will find it down. Now suppose that O measures ‘up’.
So, according to the relational interpreation, the state of S for O is actually
|ψ〉S/O =|↑〉S. Further, according to the relational interpreation, the state
of S + O for P is |ψ〉SO/P = α|up〉O |↑〉S + β|down〉O |↓〉S. According to
the Malus-Born law, the probabilty that P will find the state at t3 to be
|up〉O |↑〉S (electron spin-up and O indicating ‘up’) is |α2|, and the probabil-
ity of |down〉O |↓〉S is |β2|. So, as von Neumann taught us, the probabilities
agree. But notice: if we are to take R2 seriously, nothing said so far pre-
vents it from being the case that P finds |down〉O |↓〉S at t3, and thus S
being spin-down for P , even though S was spin-up for O!
Things get even more interesting. P will never know that S was spin-up
for O, because, for P , S was spin-down for O. That is, P measures not S’s
state in isolation (|ψ〉S/P ), but S + O. And, for P , O’s state is ‘down.’ So,
for P , O’s observation is consistent with P ’s own observation of S (as part
of the S + O system). So, while O observed ‘up’ accord to O, O observed
‘down’ according to P . Any any subsequent observations P does are going to
be consistent with all the other observations that P has done. But here’s the
puzzle: we have parallel sets of consistent events relative to O and P , which
nevertheless disagree. Consider a case where O is Schro¨dinger’s cat and P is
the evil experimenter. The cat could be dead for the cat, while he’s alive for
P . If you think that there is a problem with spontaneous reanimation, then
you might think there is a problem with the relational interpretation.
You might think that one could solve the “dispute” between P and O
at t2 over whether the state of S has collapsed, at least in principle. After
all, we know we can specify an observable that will distinguish between S
being in a superposition and S having collapsed without doing anything that
would actually collapse S or reveal its state. Indeed, as Wigner has shown,
it is possible to do so, and so it might be possible to adjudicate the dispute.
This too fails, however, because the observable must be specified relative to a
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cut. It is not the case that there is some Aˆ that each observer could apply to
|ψ〉S. Instead, there is a AˆS/O that O can apply to |ψ〉S/O and a AˆSO/P that
O can apply to |ψ〉SO/P . Now, according to Rovelli, the former observable at
(or just after) t2 will indicate that the system is not in a superposition, while
the later will indicate that it is. This renders no contradiction, as both the
observables and the states they get applied to are different.
One might put the point in a somewhat different way.15 There is actually
some Aˆ that each observer could apply to to S to determine how the collapse
went, whether the cat collapsed it or the scientist did. But if one could
measure Aˆ, the description and the result would be relative to some enormous
measuring apparatus (if such was even possible). Say that Aˆ tells you that
S was in a superposition at t2. This is entirely compatible with S being in a
determinate state at t2 relative to O.
So we won’t solve the puzzle this way. In other words, the puzzle is not
a violation of anything observable.
5 Canonical Cuts
One way to solve the problem might be to suppose that there are canoni-
cal ways to cut up particular physical situations. In all the contexts we’re
interested in, it will be obvious where to place the cut between system and
metasystem. This response shares affinities with Bohr’s interpretation, which
insists on careful specification of the measuring apparatus and the system in
a way that lends itself to an unambiguous interpretation and communication
of the measurement.
If I’m interested in testing some predictions about superconducting nano-
belts, I will go down to the lab down in the basement of the physics building,
get out my sample, position it among various standard bits of equipment,
and start running some tests. It is obvious what the system whose states
or properties I’m interested in is: the sample of nanobelts. It is equally
obvious what counts as part of the measurement system: the various bits
of lab equipment that I use to perform the experiment. One could argue
that this will be the case for any physical situation of interest, and thus that
there are canonical observer-system cuts. Furthermore, canonical cuts may
be helpful in explaining experience, if we can explain how such cuts match
up with our ordinary perspectives.
15I’m indebted to Craig Callender for this alternative.
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There is something dissatisfying, and perhaps even ad hoc about this
solution. Must we really introduce such canonical cuts? Are there really
canonical cuts in all physical situations of interest, or merely in a narrow class
of circumscribed experimental situations? On the very frontiers of science,
experimentalists must work very hard to design measuring equipment that
can actually isolate interesting phenomena. It is very far from obvious how
to separate system from observer. What happens if we insist that any old
cut will do?
6 Is Quantum Consistency Enough?
Without adverting to something like a canonical cut, the relationalist has a
ready answer to this paradox: the problem only gets off the ground if one
assumes some absolute standpoint from which to view the situation. Because
of the self-consistency of the quantum framework, any possible standpoint
is going to predict consistent results among any subsystems of the system
under consideration. This consistency is taken as a cardinal virtue of the
relational interpretation by its adherents:
This internal self-consistency of the quantum formalism is gen-
eral, and it is perhaps its most remarkable aspect. This self con-
sistency is taken in relational quantum mechanics as a strong
indication of the relational nature of the world. [Laud05]
Just as a number of seeming paradoxes in relativity disappear when we let go
of the notion of absolute simultaneity, this paradox disappears when we let go
of the absolute standpoint, of absolute states, quantities, and events. Once
we give up the idea of absolute state, we are unable to state the paradox; any
description allowable by quantum mechanics will allow full consistency. We
can describe the match between the S and O from the point of view of P , and
we can compare the points-of-view of O and P from yet another observer, Q,
and in all of these situations, the results will come out consistent. It is only
if we assume that different observers are embedded in a larger, non-quantum
view-from-nowhere that paradoxes arise. As Rovelli says,
the notion “A system O has information about a system S” is
a physical notion that can be studied experimentally (by a third
observer), in the same way as any other physical property of a
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system. In particular, the question “Do observers O and [P ] get
the same answers out of a system S?” is a meaningless question.
It is a question about the absolute state of O and [P ]. What
is meaningful is to reformulate this question in terms of some
observer. [Rov97, p. 204]
That O observed ‘spin-up’ is not a fact that can be stated absolutely. We
cannot ask a statement about O’s knowledge without reference to another
observer. From t2 to t3, we can consider questions about the answer that
O gets from the standpoint of O, who will arrive at a determinate answer
because of the break down of the unitary dynamics, and we can consider from
the standpoint of P , where O will at first be correlated with the superposed
states of S, and then become determinate when the dynamics breaks down
because of P ’s own intervention.
The move here can again be understood by analogy, this time to special
relativity (so, we end where we begin). In special relativity, certain paradoxes
arise, where observer Q observes event A to precede event B, while observer
R sees A following B. The contradiction disappears when we give up the
notion of absolute simultaneity. Likewise, the contradictions disappear in
quantum mechanics when we give up the notion of absolute state or absolute
physical quantities. In special relativity, certain invariants remain, like the
worldlines of particles through spacetime. Likewise, in relational quantum
mechanics, the physical relations between systems remain invariant. (O and
P agree about the relation of O to S, but at t2 they disagree about the
determinacy of each.)
The view has its attractions. Unlike realistic-collapse theories, it takes
the predictions of the formalism with full seriousness. It will in fact conflict
with collapse theories when it comes to whether P could measure a superpo-
sition (Aˆ) at t2. Unlike ordinary no-collapse theories, it gives us determinate
measurement records (as determinate as we could want) without adverting
to a dualistic solution to do so, for the theory posits no extra entities be-
yond what the ordinary formalism requires, nor does it require any quantum
minds or divergent worlds, actuality-markers or Bohmian particles, or any
such contrivances. The theory doesn’t even require reference to consciousness
or any human agents whatsoever. The processes of measurement considered
are mundane old physical interactions, ones that can (from a certain point-
of-view) be described quantum-mechanically. On the other hand, we fail to
capture the security of the unified world of classical mechanics. Maybe the
15
price isn’t so much to pay, given the dismal array of alternative options.
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